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Abstract
We discuss our attempts to develop a short-term phenomenological training program for
training naïve participants in phenomenological skills. After reviewing existing
methodologies for collecting phenomenological data and clarifying the benefit of the shortterm training approach, we present two training programs and two experiments that tested
their effectiveness. Experiment 1 tested the two-stage training program, which consists of (i)
the illusion training which instructs participants to describe the experience of a visual illusion
and (ii) the guidance training which offers individualized feedbacks for improving their
description. This program proved effective, but also excessively skill-demanding. Experiment
2 tested the one-stage training program, consisting only of the illusion training; it was easier
to use, but exhibited a smaller training effect. The paper concludes by delineating
methodological lessons from the experiments focusing on three themes: (i) Individual
difference in phenomenological aptitude; (ii) Bounded transferability of phenomenological
skills; (iii) Active intervention in the learning process.

1. Introduction
Many agree that further progress in experimental psychology requires the coordination between
objective, third-personal methods and first-personal, phenomenological, or subjective methods of
inquiry. One influential methodological proposal for achieving such coordination is
neurophenomenology (Lutz & Thompson, 2003; Valenzuela-Moguillansky, Vasquez-Rosati, &
Riegler, 2017; Varela, 1996), an experimental paradigm for coordinating behavioral and neural data
with phenomenological data – that is, subjective reports or descriptions collected from the
experimental subjects about their conscious experience – in mutually constraining ways.1

One immediate question that arises in response to neurophenomenology concerns the
methods for collecting reliable phenomenological data. Articulating subjective features of one’s
experience is a difficult task. One can fail to do so in many different ways. For one thing, it is already
difficult to be clear about the task itself. On being asked to describe the key subjective features of
one’s experience, one can simply be lost about the request in the first place. Even when the request
itself is squarely understood, as Claire Petitmengin points out, one can easily go awry when actually
trying to meet it: one might fail to focus well enough on the experience to develop careful
descriptions; one might inadvertently describe objective features of what one is experiencing instead
of subjective features of the experience itself; one might base their report not on their first-hand
experience, but on their second-hand knowledge about mind and consciousness, etc. (Petitmengin
2006, pp. 233-239) In fact, there are even psychological studies indicating that our verbal reports on
our own mental processes are highly unreliable (Nisbett & Wilson 1977). Given all these
complications, how can we obtain reliable phenomenological descriptions from experimental
subjects? Call this the problem of phenomenological data collection.

1

Another way of achieving such coordination is by having the experimenters undertake phenomenological
descriptions (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012) or systematic introspections (Weger & Wagemann, 2015) of their own
experience.
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Researchers engaged in neurophenomenology have addressed this problem in various ways.
Existing approaches to the problem, however, tend to be exceedingly ‘expensive’ in that they require
either the experimenter or the experimental participants to undergo distinctly time- and effortconsuming trainings. We have no doubt they will contribute to the development of
neurophenomenology by producing quality research, but we worry that they might make the paradigm
highly inaccessible to a wide range of experimenters interested in starting to investigate the subjective
features of conscious experience. To improve the accessibility to neurophenomenology, in this study,
we pursue a ‘cheaper’ solution to the problem of phenomenological data collection: that is, we
propose to solve it by developing a short-term phenomenological training program, that is, a
systematic training program that can equip naive experimental subjects with the ability to produce
reliable descriptions of their experience in a very short period of time. The objective of this paper is to
report the results of our experiments testing the effectivity of such programs and to discuss their
methodological lessons.
To be clear from the outset, the experiments were still at the pilot stage and the results were
mixed. We nevertheless think it would be valuable to share them with the research community so that
others will have the opportunity to learn from our attempt. Neurophenomenology is a young
paradigm. Many neurophenomenological studies have been successfully carried out, for example,
with respect to preictal states that precedes epileptic seizures (Petitmengin, Baulac, & Navarro, 2006;
Petitmengin, Navarro, & Le Van Quyen, 2007), the sense of body ownership in rubber hand illusion
experiments (Valenzuela-Moguillansky, O’Regan, & Petitmengin 2013), altered self-experiences in
meditative and psychedelic states (Millière, Carhart-Harris, Roseman, Trautwein, & BerkovichOhana, 2018), yet the methodology is far from established. Reports and analyses of attempts to
sophisticate the method should prove invaluable for the future development of the field (Bockelman,
Reinerman-Jones, & Gallagher, 2013). We aim to contribute to the development of
neurophenomenology in this way by clarifying some difficulties with developing a short-term training
approach to it.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section situates our project in the
landscape of neurophenomenology by offering a taxonomy of existing methods for collecting
phenomenological data. Section 3 introduces the two-stage phenomenological training program,
which consists of two stages of trainings: illusion training and guidance training. Section 4 discusses
Experiment 1 which tested the effectiveness of this program. Section 5 presents Experiment 2, a
follow-up experiment that tested the effectiveness of a one-stage training program consisting only of
the illusion training. Section 6 reports our observations of the experimental results and discusses their
methodological implications.

2. A taxonomy of methods for phenomenological data collection

How can neurophenomenologists collect reliable phenomenological data? Different approaches are
proposed to answer this methodological challenge. In what follows, we introduce four existing
approaches that represent the current state of art: two approaches that involve experimental
participants who have received some form of special training for developing phenomenological skills,
the long-term training approach and the short-term training approach (Section 2.1); two approaches
that do not require special trainings on the part of the participants, the phenomenological interview
approach and the questionnaire approach (Section 2.2). Each approach is considered as a final
consequence of taking different paths on a decision tree with three decision nodes (Figure 1).2

A few notes are in order before moving on. First, the following only concerns approaches to the
problem of phenomenological data collection developed within the domain of experimental
psychology. This means that phenomenological methodologies developed for qualitative studies in
psychology, such as Amedeo Giorgi’s modified Husserlian approach (Giorgi 2009), falls out of the
scope of the current review (see Langdridge 2007 for an extensive review of phenomenological

2

Solomonova & Sha (2016) sketches a similar classification of different methods for collecting first-person
reports of dream experience (Solomonova & Sha, 2016, p. 414).
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approaches in qualitative psychology). Second, the four approaches are not meant to be mutually
exclusive: It is possible that they be combined or coordinated within a single experiment. This is not a
taxonomy of competing approaches to the problem of phenomenological data collection. Third, the
goal of the taxonomy is to provide a systematic viewpoint which allows us to have a better grasp of
the theoretical landscape and not to give a detailed description of each and every available option.
Accordingly, some approaches that deserve much more attention in its own right are only briefly
mentioned in the following.

2.1 The Training Approaches
The first node (“Training”) separates the existing approaches into two classes: those that involve a
phenomenological training on the subject and those that do not. The second node (“Duration”)
separates the former into two sub-classes, namely, long-term training and short-term training
approaches.
The long-term training approach is introduced in Varela (1996) where the idea of
neurophenomenology was originally advanced. According to Varela, there are three basic steps in
phenomenological description (Varela, 1996, pp. 336-337). The first step is to suspend what is often
called the “natural attitude” (Husserl 1931) – that is, the background state of taking it for granted that
the real objects exist in itself prior to our conscious experience of it and the accompanying tendency
to attend to things in the real world – and to reorient one’s attention reflectively towards the
experience of these objects. The second step is to develop an intimacy with conscious experience
itself, a new field of inquiry opened up by the suspension of the natural attitude. The third step is to
produce linguistic descriptions of the experience.
Following these steps is a highly skilled practice: It is not something anyone can do by just
being provided with explicit instructions. Thus, Varela argues that phenomenological description is
truly possible only for those who undergo “sustained training and steady learning” (Varela, 1996, p.

5

337). To collect reliable phenomenological data, therefore, we need experimental subjects who are
already adept at phenomenological description thanks to their prior engagement with a long-term
training in the practice. This long-term approach to neurophenomenology is actively pursued under
the title of “contemplative neuroscience,” in which the contemplative expertise of experienced
meditation practitioners “plays an investigative role as central and indispensable as those of
experimental observation and mathematical analysis” (Thompson, 2014, p. 78)
The short-term training approach, in contrast, aims to develop phenomenological skills of
naïve subjects within the short timeframe of a single lab visit. While promoting the long-term
approach in his original article, Varela and his colleagues have also conducted
neurophenomenological experiments based on this short-term approach. Lutz, Lachaux, Martinerie,
and Varela (2002), for example, collected descriptions of varying features of the noetic component
(Section 2) of the subjects’ experience by running a short training session on them who were not
experienced practitioners of any form of phenomenology. This approach has the potential of vastly
increasing the feasibility of neurophenomenological experiments as they can now be conducted
without enlisting expert phenomenologists. In this regard, however, it is unfortunate that the training
procedures have not been described in enough detail for others to know exactly how to carry out the
training. It is probably no accident, we therefore think, that the short-term training approach is not as
popular as the long-term training approach in recent studies.

2.2 The Non-training Approaches
Let us come back to the taxonomy (Figure 1). The third node (“Conversation”) separates those
approaches that do not involve phenomenological training into two classes: the phenomenological
interview approach and the questionnaire approach.
In the phenomenological interview approach, experimenters collect phenomenological data
by conducting interviews on their experimental subjects. Phenomenological interview methods are
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proposed in various forms in the literature (Høffding & Martiny, 2016; Hurlburt & Akhter, 2006;
Olivares, Vargas, Fuentes, Martínez-Pernía, & Canales-Johnson, 2015; Petitmengin, 2006). In
general, they have a common strength and weakness compared to the training approaches: The
strength is that it reduces the amount of cognitive burden imposed on the subjects, who can then
spend more cognitive effort to the act of description itself; the weakness is that the experimenters
must undergo considerable training to acquire appropriate interview skills. Despite this practical
difficulty, the interview approach is arguably more popular than the training approaches in recent
neurophenomenology and phenomenologically-oriented psychological studies (Brouwers et al., 2018;
Depraz, 2018; Valenzuela Moguillansky, O'Regan, & Petitmengin, 2013).
In contrast, the phenomenological questionnaire approach uses psychological questionnaires
to resolve the problem of phenomenological data collection (Pekala, 1991). We can think of this as a
pre-fixed form of phenomenological interview: they are both ways of prompting phenomenological
descriptions by asking questions. The questionnaire approach has two major advantages: (i) It
generates phenomenological data in the form of standardized responses, which are more easier to
analyse than the qualitative data generated in the other approaches; (ii) No special skill beyond what
is taught in a standard psychology class is required for the experimenter to use phenomenological
questionnaires. A major disadvantage, on the other hand, concerns the difficulty of creating a valid
phenomenological questionnaire: Arguably, they can only be created by using phenomenological data
already collected through the other three approaches. In recent consciousness research,
phenomenological questionnaires are mostly employed to investigate altered states of consciousness,
such as impaired self-awareness in traumatic brain injury (Hart, Sherer, Whyte, Polansky, & Novack,
2004), altered self-experience in psychedelic states (Millière, 2017; Millière et al., 2018),
hallucinations in Parkinson’s deasease patients (Papapetropoulos et al., 2008), and the experience of
isolated sleep paralysis (Solomonova et al., 2008).
This concludes our brief review of the landscape of methodological approaches to the problem of
phenomenological data collection. It is not meant to be exhaustive, but we hope it is comprehensive
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enough to deliver an overall sense of the current state of art. Importantly, it indicates how the shortterm training approach is surprisingly underdeveloped despite its potential for making
neurophenomenology much more accessible than it currently is.3 In the following, we discuss our
attempt to unlock this potential by developing a short-term phenomenological training program.

3. The two-stage short-term phenomenological training program
Our short-term phenomenological training program was designed to develop two skills central to the
practice of phenomenological description. One is the skill to suspend one’s “natural attitude” (Section
2.1) and reorient one’s attention towards what we call the non-objectual aspects of conscious
experience. The other is the skill to carefully describe these non-objectual aspects.
By non-objectual aspects, we mean features of conscious experience that cannot be attributed
to the intentional object of the experience. This includes (i) the ways in which the object appears in
experience and (ii) the ways in which one is conscious of the object. The distinction is modelled on a
tripartite analysis of consciousness, famously advanced by Edmund Husserl, in which these two
aspects are each known as noematic contents and noetic acts (e.g., Husserl, 1999, p. 36). When you
see a round plate, for example, the noematic content (or the way in which the plate appears in
experience) varies as you move around it, but the plate itself does not change its objective properties.
The noetic act (or the way in which you are conscious of the plate) is partly constant and partly
variable: It is constant in that you are invariably aware of the same object through visual perception,

3

Recently, Lutz and his collaborators have advanced a training protocol that intends to develop a naïve
participant’s ability to describe the subjective features of meditations states (Abdoun et al. 2019). This may be
seen as an advance in the short-term training approach to neurophenomenology. Their protocol, however, has
different aspirations from our short-term training program in a few respects: (i) It aims to develop the relevant
phenomenological skills in two days, while we aim to achieve some development within the timeframe of a
single visit to the lab; (ii) It focuses on developing “a basic understanding of a few selected phenomenological
dimensions” (Abdoun et al. 2019, p. 61) specifically relevant to meditation experience; (iii) It is applied to the
participants by qualified instructors with considerable teaching experience rather than the experimenters
themselves.
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but variable in that you are aware of the plate with more or less clarity depending on the perspective
on it.
The training program consists of two stages of training, which we call the illusion training
and the guidance training: The first stage aims to develop the participant’s ability to attend to the nonobjectual aspects of his or her experience; the second stage aims to hone this same attentional ability
and also cultivate the descriptive ability for putting the non-objecutal aspects accurately into words.
The rest of this section presents these two training stages in more detail.

3.1 Stage 1: Illusion Training
In the illusion training, the participants are instructed to attempt a phenomenological description of
the experience of seeing illusory figures. More specifically, after receiving a brief explanation of the
distinction between objectual and non-objectual aspects of conscious experience, they are requested to
describe (i) the ways in which the object appeared to them, (ii) the ways in which they were conscious
of the object, and (iii) any other feelings involved in the experience. The first two descriptive
categories each correspond to noematic and noetic features of the experience, while the third category
is added to allow the participants to include in the description any experiential features that they do
not recognize as clearly fitting into the other two categories.
The aim of this training is to help the participants have an intuitive grasp of the non-objectual
aspects of conscious experience and develop the ability to keep their attention oriented to them.
Illusory experiences were expected to be useful for this purpose because the difference between the
object of experience (or what the experience is about) and the noematic content (or how the object
appears) is more manifest in them than in non-illusory experiences. In the current study, we used two
types of bistable figures to induce the illusory experience: the famous Necker cube and a less known
witch-man figure (Figure 2A).

9

Successful phenomenological descriptions of the illusory experience will refer to various
aspects of the experience, including objectual features (the object of experience), noematic features
(how it appears to one), noetic features (how one is aware of it), and the correlative features (how the
noetic act and the noematic content relate to each other). For example, we can expect an ideal
description of the experience of seeing a Necker cube illusion to mention features such as:
•

How the figure switches its appearance between two cubes (noematic feature);

•

How the two cubes are oriented differently (noematic feature);

•

How each cube appearance corresponds to different imaginative perspectives on the cube
(noetic feature);

•

How each appearance can be brought about by controlling the perspective through which one
views the figure (correlative feature);

•

How difficult it is nevertheless to keep one appearance constant over time (noetic feature),
etc.

Likewise, we can expect an ideal description of the experience of seeing a witch-man figure to
mention:
•

How the figure switches its appearance between the two faces, the witch’s and the man’s
(noematic feature);

•

How the two faces exhibit different spatial dimensionality – the witch’s face is represented
two dimensionally, while the man’s face represents an additional dimension of depth
(noematic feature);

•

How the two faces appear under different imaginative lighting conditions – the man’s face
summons up a non-real lighting from the left, while the witch’s face indicates no non-real
lightings (noematic feature);

•

How one’s gaze and attention scan the image during the viewing (noetic feature);

•

How each appearance can be brought about by controlling one’s attention (correlative
feature);
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•

How the configuration of the image guides one’s gaze and attention (correlative feature), etc.4

By effortfully attempting to describe these implicit aspects of their illusory experience, we expected
the participants to improve their general capacity to attend to the non-objectual aspects even beyond
the realm of illusory visual experience.

3.2 Stage 2: Guidance Training
The guidance training aims to improve the participants’ ability to address the non-objectual aspects,
including the ability to verbally articulate them, by providing them with individualised feedbacks and
guidance. They first receive evaluative feedbacks about their initial description of their illusory
experience produced in the illusion training. The trainer indicates how each element of their
description managed to address objectual or non-objecutal aspects of the experience. After that, they
are provided with an individualized guidance for improving their description of the non-objectual
aspects, based on which they are instructed once again to produce a description of the same
experience. Finally, they receive another round of evaluative feedbacks in regard to this newly
produced description.
The guidance consists primarily of questions, which prompt the participant to attempt to
articulate the relevant aspect of their experience. For example, the questions used in relation to the
experience of seeing the Necker cube included the following:
•

How many cubes did you see?

•

What are the differences between the two cube appearances?

4

The descriptions of Necker cube illusion are based on those presented by the French phenomenologist Maurice
Merleau-Ponty (2012, pp. 273-276) and the American phenomenologist Don Ihde (2012, p. 65f.). Descriptions
for the witch-man figure were produced and corroborated intersubjectively among the authors. Since the witchman figure is not discussed in existing phenomenological literature, we could not check them against other
expert or classical phenomenologists.
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•

Can you control the appearance at your will?

•

Can you try to see the figure as a 2D pattern?

•

What did you do when you tried to do this?

•

How does it feel when you try to do this?

Likewise, the questions used in relation to the experience of seeing the witch-man figure included the
following:
•

How many things did you see?

•

What are the differences between the different appearances?

•

Can you control the appearance at your will?

•

Can you try to see the figure as not representing anything?

•

What did you do when you tried to do this?

•

How does it feel when you try to do this?

Each participant receives different guiding questions depending on the content of their initial
description. The first questions in the above lists, for example, will not be asked to someone who has
already mentioned the alternation between two cube or face appearances. On the other hand, those
who did not even mention this in their first attempt are not supposed to be presented with the last few
questions before being guided through the experience with the first few ones.

4. Experiment 1
4.1 Material and methods
To test the effectiveness of the two-stage short-term training program, we conducted a psychological
experiment that compares the quality of phenomenological descriptions produced before, between,
and after the illusion and guidance trainings. Assuming the effectiveness of the training program, we
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expected that the subjects would become better at addressing the non-objectual aspects of the
experience in their description after each training stage.

4.1.1 Participants
13 healthy participants (age 21–24, mean = 22.7; 6 females) were recruited from the subject pool at
Osaka University. They had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None of them had prior exposure
to the philosophical tradition of Husserlian phenomenology. They were randomly allocated to the
experimental group (10 participants) and the control group (3 participants). Informed consent was
obtained from all the participants prior to the experiment. The experiment was conducted at the
National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT). The experimental
protocol was approved by the ethics and safety committees of NICT.

4.1.2 Stimuli
We used two bistable figures, the Necker cube and the witch-man figure (Figure 2A), for training
stimuli; two figures that closely resemble them yet do not induce bistable perception for false-training
stimuli (Figure 2B). The false training was conducted on the control group to control the potential
training effect of repetition. For test stimuli, we used one 2D image and two 3D objects: an
illustration of a smiling face, a branch, and a glass (Figure 2C). All three stimuli were used for all
three test phases of the experiment. We kept from using illusory images as test stimuli and instead
chose these non-illusory stimuli, which are unlikely to induce visual illusions, since we aimed to train
phenomenological skills with some general applicability—that is, the ability to better describe
different kinds of experience from the one used in the training.
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4.1.3 Task procedure
The experiment consisted of three test phases and two training phases (Figure 2D).
In the test phases, the participants were instructed to attempt a phenomenological description of the
experience of seeing the test stimuli by paying special attention to (i) the ways in which the object
appeared to them, (ii) the ways in which they were conscious of the object, and (iii) any other feelings
involved in the experience. The description session lasted up to 10 minutes (pre-test) or 5 minutes
(mid-test, post-test) for each experience. To encourage careful reflection upon the experience, the
participants were allowed to start the verbal report only after the first minute of each session. We also
instructed that they are free to stop the report and quietly reflect upon the experience during the
session. They were also free to end the session before spending full time if they felt they had nothing
more to describe about the experience. In the pre-test, a brief explanation of the non-objectual aspects
of conscious experience was provided in the beginning. In the mid-test and the post-test, the
participants were instructed to give priority to novel descriptive contents over what has already been
reported in the earlier tests.
In the illusion training, the participants were instructed to describe the experience of seeing
bistable figures focusing on its non-objectual aspects (Section 3.1). The control group was instructed
to do the same in regard to the experience of seeing non-bistable figures that closely resembled the
bistable figures presented to the experimental group (Figure 2B). The description session lasted up to
15 minutes for each stimulus, but the participants were only allowed to start reporting after the first
minute of the session to encourage careful reflection. They were also free to intermit or end their
description before full time.
In the guidance training, the participants received both positive and negative feedbacks on the
quality of the description they produced during the illusion training; then they were provided with an
individualized guidance for improving their description (Section 3.2). The control group was provided
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with a false feedback and a false guidance: We simply rehearsed the descriptions they produced
during the illusion training and then instructed the subject to confirm the content of those descriptions.

4.1.4 Data analysis
Data analysis was conducted in the following steps. The first step is data preparation: Verbal reports
from the test phases were transcribed based on video- and audio-recordings of the description sessions
and incomplete transcriptions produced during the session in real time; then the transcriptions were
parsed into meaningful units, which would become the direct object of analysis.
The second step is data analysis. Each unit was given a label that indicates the nature of its
content according to the following steps (Figure 3): (i) Decide whether the unit addresses the current
experience of viewing the object or something else; (ii-a) When it concerns the current experience,
determine whether the unit reports on objectual or non-objectual features of the experience; (ii-b)
When it concerns something other than the current experience, determine whether the unit reports on
associations or offers speculative explanations of the experience; (iii-a) When it reports on objectual
features, determine if it identifies the object of experience or describes features of the object; (iii-b)
When it reports on non-objectual features of the experience, determine whether the unit addresses
features of the way the object appears to one (noematic features), features of the way one is aware of
the object (noetic feature), features of the way in which these two aspects affect each other
(correlative features), or other non-objectual features that do not squarely fit into these categories;
(iii-c) When it reports on associations, determine whether it is about an associated thought, memory,
imagination, or emotion; (iii-d) When it offers a speculative explanation, determine if it is a
speculative sub-personal account or a speculative generalization.
The third step is data evaluation. The effect of the training program was evaluated by
comparing the descriptions produced before and after each training. There were three basic evaluation
criteria: (i) Whether the description has become more focused on the present experience as a result of
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the training; (ii) Whether the description after the training has come to address non-objectual aspects
that were not addressed before the training; (iii) Whether the description after the training has come to
address non-objectual aspects that were already addressed before the training in more depth. Based on
these criteria, each participant was evaluated either as effectively trained, exhibiting limited training
effect, or exhibiting no justifiable effect.

4.2 Results
Some form of improvement in the ability to describe the non-objectual aspects of conscious
experience was observed in eight of the ten training participants (Table 1A). Five participants (#2, #5,
#7, #8, #10) exhibited improvement both in their ability to describe non-objectual features of pictorial
perception (or the experience of seeing 2D images) and object perception (or the experience of seeing
3D objects); all of them somewhat improved their descriptive skills after the illusion training, and
further honed their skills after the guidance training. Two participants (#4, #6) showed improvement
only in regard to pictorial perception; one of them (#6) already exhibited some improvement after the
first stage, the illusion training. One participant (#9) showed improvement only in the mid-test taken
after the first stage of the training program. Two participants (#1, #3) left no evidence of improvement
in their test results. In comparison, no participants in the control group exhibited evidence of
improvement (Table 1B).

4.2.1 An example of an effectively trained participant
One participant for whom the training program proved effective (#10), for example, made the
following report in the pre-test regarding the experience of seeing a branch:
Pre-test description. I noticed that the color of the whole branch is different just like there is a
front and a back, and that it gets thinner towards the end, making a Y-shape at the tip. I
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thought that perhaps branches on the street I always use have different parts by looking
carefully, I see them without thinking much, but maybe I really just see them for a moment. 5

The first sentence only describes features of the branch as opposed to non-objectual features of the
experience. The second sentence offers a general claim about experiences of the same type as opposed
to describing the current particular experience of seeing the branch. These indicate that the participant
was neither able to focus on one’s present experience here and now, nor to reorient one’s attention
from the object of the experience to the experience as such. After taking the illusion training,
however, the same participant offered the following description in the mid-test.
Mid-test description. Before, I was seeing the branch from above since I intended to see its
shape, but I’m thinking now what it would look like if I see it from the right, what if I change
the way I see it. I’m starting to think that maybe this part of the end [of the branch] changes
its color or that there will be more of these bumpy stuffs.
In this description, the participant is still focused more on the features of the branch itself (“its color”
“bumpy stuffs”) as opposed to the non-objectual aspects of the experience. However, s/he also starts
to attend to features of the way s/he is aware of the object (noetic features) and explore how it
correlates with the noematic content (“what it would look like […] if I change the way I see it”). This
suggests that the first stage of the training already had some training effects albeit to a limited extent.
Then after the second, guidance stage of the training, the same participant offered the
following description in the post-test:
Post-test description. When I lift the closer end, the way I see it changes, and as I put more
focus on the closer, thin end, it looks like stretching toward me, and if I shift my gaze to the
thicker end, […] the feeling of its sticking towards me decreases. […] If I gaze at the closer

5

The original description was produced in Japanese and translated into English by [the corresponding author].
The same applies for all the following descriptions.
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parts, I can’t see the distant parts, and on the other hand, if I gaze at the branch at the distant
end, because the thick end is bent, I become unable to see how bent it is.
This passage suggests improvement in the participant’s phenomenological skill in several respects:
First, the description is consistently focused on the current experience of seeing the branch, which
was not obviously the case in the previous descriptions. Second, it reports on features of the way in
which the object appears in the experience (noematic features), which are not directly attributed to the
object itself (“it looks like stretching toward me,” “unable to see how bent it is”). Third, it discusses
how the noematic content (how the branch appears) depends on the noetic act (how one is aware of
the branch) (“if I shift my gaze …”). By comparing the three reports, thus, we concluded that the twostage training program was effective for this participant. Furthermore, it has been noticed that the
illusion training was already somewhat effective in itself without being followed by the second stage
of guidance training.

4.2.2 An example of a participant exhibiting no justifiable training effect
Compare this successful example with descriptions offered by another participant for whom the
training program was ineffective (#1). Before taking any training, this subject only uttered the
following to describe the experience of seeing a glass:
Pre-test description. I did not know what to do as I have never gazed at a glass in my life so
far. I thought I shall see the features of the glass, and I was gazing at the glass paying
attention to its features: the weight, the thickness, and so on of the glass itself.
Given the poverty of the initial description, one might think it would be easy for this participant to
improve the description after taking the training, even if this did not make her/him an excellent
phenomenologist. Even after undergoing the two stages of training, however, s/he only managed to
provide the following two-sentence description regarding the same experience:
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Post-test description. It’s pretty heavy, so it won’t fall by putting a flower in it, and as its top
is wide open, you can easily put a flower in it as a vase. If it’s a glass, it looks like an easy
glass to drink from because of its wide opening.
Certainly, the description has almost doubled in length. However, this is not because the participant
has become more attentive to the non-objectual aspects of the experience. Rather, the post-test
description is longer only because it reports on associated thoughts about the presented object.
Accordingly, we concluded these descriptive data as indicating the ineffectiveness of the training
program for this participant.

4.2.3 An example of a participant exhibiting limited training effect
The training program was more effective in regard to pictorial perception (or the experience of seeing
a 2D image) compared to object perception (or the experience of seeing a 3D object). This was
indicated from the fact that two participants, for whom the training program was not entirely
effective, still improved their phenomenological skill regarding pictorial perception. For example, one
participant (#4) provided the following descriptions about seeing an illustration of a smiling face:
Pre-test description. What I thought by seeing it was that it resembles those stamps used in
LINE [a chat app widely used in Japan] and other SNS. Also, my eyes were drawn to the
smeared or blurred parts of the edge of the print. Also, there are thick and faint lines in the
bottom right, and my eyes were drawn to the fact that the print is somewhat uneven.
Post-test description. It constantly looks to be a smiling face, but if you keep looking at it, it
starts to feel like an evil smile. As I learned from the earlier image that you don’t see the
whole when you focus on any one point, I directed my gaze at one of the ellipses which looks
like an eye. But I gradually became less focused and started to see the whole vaguely, and
then […] the picture of the smiley mark looked like three pictures, and I thought that it can
also look like a picture whose central parts pop out towards me […]
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The pre-test description here contains three types of descriptive contents: features of the object (“thick
and faint lines”); noetic features of the experience (“my eyes were drawn”); associative thoughts (“it
resembles those stamps”). In contrast, the post-test description reports on the correlative features of
the experience by noting that how one sees the object (“became less focused,” “see the whole
vaguely”) affect its appearance to one (“looked like three pictures,” “looked like a picture whose
central parts …”). The same participant’s post-test descriptions concerning 3D object perception,
however, exhibited no such change. Compare the following two descriptions of the experience of
seeing a glass each obtained in the pre-test and the post-test:
Pre-test description. First of all, I think by seeing its shape that the glass is probably for
drinking beer. Then I wondered if it is heat resistant glass. Otherwise I was concerned about
the stain because I use to be in food industry.
Post-test description. What I felt by seeing now is, since there is a bump around the top: what
meaning does this have? I was wondering that it might have the function of keeping drinks
from drooping down, as this often happens, and whether this bump is formed due to a
problem with the manufacturing process. […]
Both descriptions report primarily on associated ideas rather than the present experience of seeing the
glass (“I wondered if it is heat resistant glass”, “I was wondering that it might have the function of
keeping drinks from drooping down”). Despite the indication of positive training effect with respect
to the experience of seeing 2D images, it seems that this participant remained unable to reorient one’s
attention to the non-objectual features of the experience of seeing 3D objects.

4.3 Discussion
Experiment 1 tested the effectiveness of the two-stage phenomenological training program, consisting
of illusion training and guidance training. Eight of the ten participants who received the training
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showed somewhat positive responses to the training: Five produced improved phenomenological
descriptions after the training both when presented with a 2D image and a 3D object; two indicated
improvement only with respect to the experience of seeing a 2D image; one exhibited improvement
only after the illusion training. Two participants left no indication of improvement after the training.
In short, it has been demonstrated that the two-stage training program is significantly effective in
developing phenomenological skills in naïve participants. At the same time, a considerable degree of
individual difference was observed in each participant’s response to the same training program.
These results diffuse the in-principle worry that it must be impossible to develop a specialized
skill of this kind in such a short frame of time. In our light, this is not particularly surprising since the
training program did not aim to have naïve participants master the art of phenomenological
description, but only aimed to induce some degree of development in their phenomenological
competency. Given the current trend in neurophenomenology to draw on more ‘expensive’ methods
of phenomenological data collection (Section 1), we believe that training programs of such limited
effects are already beneficial for the future of first-person approaches to consciousness research in
general and neurophenomenology in particular.
By attempting the two-stage program, it also became clear that the guidance training demands
more skill and experience than expected, for the current scheme requires that the experimenter
provide an adequate feedback to each participant without knowing what she will say in advance. This
suggests that some form of special training would be required for anyone to conduct an experiment
using our training program. But this goes against our original motivation to develop a short-term
training program which was to make the phenomenological method readily accessible to researchers
who are interested in exploring the subjective features of conscious experience, but not yet committed
enough to go through burdensome trainings. An easy way out might be to remove the guidance stage
from the program at all to make a one-stage program consisting only of the illusion training. In fact, it
has been indicated that the illusion training alone can have some training effect on the participant:
Seven participants (#2, #5, #6, #7, #8, #9, #10) showed some improvement in their mid-test
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descriptions (Table 1A). To determine the prospect of this proposal, we conducted a second
experiment to test whether a one-stage program of this kind will develop a naïve participant’s
phenomenological skill.

5. Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 indicated that the short-term training program will be easier to conduct
without the guidance training and also that the illusion training was effective on its own. We designed
Experiment 2 to reconfirm the hypothesis that phenomenological skills can be effectively developed
through some form of illusion training alone.

5.1 Material and methods
5.1.1 Participants
18 healthy participants (age 19–35, mean = 22.4; 8 males, 10 females) were recruited from the subject
pool at Osaka University. They had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. None of them had prior
exposure to phenomenology as a philosophical tradition. Informed consent was obtained from all the
participants prior to the experiment. The experiment was conducted at the National Institute of
Information and Communications Technology (NICT). The experimental protocol was approved by
the ethics and safety committees of NICT.

5.1.2 Stimuli
Two bistable figures, a Necker cube and a Rubin vase, were used as training stimuli (Figure 4A).
Two two-dimensional figures were used as test stimuli: the “cracked egg” and the witch-man figure
(Figure 4B). Both stimuli were used in both test phases before and after the training. We only tested
the participants with 2D images: Experiment 1 indicated that the training was more effective with
respect to pictorial perception, so we decided that it would be more efficient to leave out 3D objects to
determine whether the modified illusion training has any training effect at all.
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5.1.3 Task Procedure
The experiment consisted of three phases: the pre-training test (pre-test), the illusion training, and the
post-training test (post-test) (Figure 4).
Just like Experiment 1, in the test phases, participants were instructed to attempt a
phenomenological description of the experience of seeing two test stimuli by paying special attention
to (i) the ways in which the object appeared to them, (ii) the ways in which they were conscious of the
object, and (iii) any other feelings involved in the experience. For each stimulus, they had 10 minutes
to reflect upon and describe the experience of seeing it. To encourage careful reflection, they were
instructed to start reporting only after the first minute of the session. They were free to stop the report
and quietly reflect upon the experience during the session, as well as end the session before spending
full time if they felt they had nothing more to say.
In the pre-test, we provided a brief lecture on the phenomenological practice of describing the
non-objectual aspects of one’s experience. We have updated the content of the lecture from that
provided in Experiment 1 to make it easier for the participants to grasp the idea. Most updates
concerned minor choices of verbal expressions. The only major change that has been made was that
we have added an analogy with the practice of analysing pictures and films to explain the idea of
describing the ways in which objects appear in experience: On seeing a picture or a film, one can talk
about objects and events depicted in them, but they can also attend to and describe the ways in which
these things are being depicted, for example, in terms of composition, lightning, color contrast, etc.;
the participants were instructed to attend to and describe the ways in which objects appear in their
experience in a comparable manner.
In the training phase, the participants were instructed to describe the experience of seeing
bistable figures focusing on its non-objectual aspects, just like in the illusion training phase of
Experiment 1 (Section 4.1.3). The description session lasted up to 15 minutes for each stimulus, but
the participants were only allowed to start reporting after the first minute of the session to encourage
careful reflection. They were also free to intermit or end their description before full time. Since we

23

already confirmed in Experiment 1 that a control-group counterpart of the illusion training brings
about no training effect (Section 4.2), we did not have a separate control group in Experiment 2.

5.1.4 Data Analysis
Data analysis took the same steps as Experiment 1 (Section 4.1.4). Since only 2D images were used in
the test phases, however, participants were categorized as either effectively trained or exhibiting no
justifiable training effect; the category limited training effect was not used in this experiment.

5.2 Results
The one-stage training program proved effective for five participants (#4, #7, #11, #15, #18). Two
participants (#16, #17) seem to show no improvement primarily because they were relatively adept at
attending to and describing the non-objectual aspects of their experience since before the training.
Seven participants (#1, #2, #3, #5, #6, #9, #13) exhibited limited degrees of attentiveness to their
experience both before and after the training, indicating no improvement in their ability through the
training. Four participants (#8, #10, #12, #14) consistently failed to focus on the present perceptual
experience which they have been asked to describe. (Table 2 summarizes examples of pre-test and
post-test descriptions produced by each participant)
5.2.1 An example of an effectively trained participant
One participant (#7), for whom the one-stage training program proved effective, started like many
others by primarily reporting what one is seeing and thoughts associated to the perceptual experience
in question. For example:

Pre-test description (“Cracked egg”). As for how it appears, this part looks like wave, it was
first in this orientation, but it rather looks in this orientation; the bottom half is water, and I
imagined it to be like a sea. And after this looked like a wave and a sea, I thought it resembles
one of the LINE stamps I use frequently.
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The first sentence in this passage describes that the presented figure has been seen as a wave or a
body of water (object of experience), while briefly touching on how it appears to be oriented in one
way or another (noematic feature). The second sentence reports on an associated thought rather than
the experience of viewing itself. After the training, the same participant becomes more focused on the
perceptual experience at issue, and the noematic description becomes more elaborate. For example:

Post-test description (“Cracked egg”). It again began the same as before, this side is water
and this side sky; it looks like a sea. I thought to think of a different way of seeing it; the
upper side can be sea, so I try to think that way, and then it's like a different beach. Earlier it
was like a swimming wave, the upper half was like sky or the background, but I think of the
upper as sea, I felt that the lower side looks like a beach.

The first sentence reports that one side of the figure has been seen as an image of the sky and a body
of water (object of experience). Rather than just saying that it appeared in one orientation or another
as in the pre-test description, the rest of this passage articulates the difference between the noematic
features of the two appearances by describing one in terms of wave and sky and the other in terms of
beach and sea. The participant is also much more focused on describing the current experience. We
therefore concluded that this participant has improved her/his phenomenological skills to attend to
and describe one’s experience through the training program.

5.2.2 An example of a participant with no justifiable training effects
Many participants kept describing features of the stimulus both before and after the training, which
indicates their failure to re-direct their attention to the experience itself, or more precisely, to the nonobjectual aspects of their experience. Here is an example from one participant (#6):
Pre-test description (“Cracked egg”). It looked like a figure of a circle with a wavy line in it.
It’s a front-loading washing machine, and it looked like it’s running. The wave is not
constant; it’s bumpy and pointed […]
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Post-test description (“Cracked egg”). “There is a circle drawn on the paper, and there’s a
wavy line in it. The circle is not elliptical but a neat circle […]
Both descriptions only mention the object of the experience (“circle with a wavy line”) or its features
(“bumpy and pointed”, “neat circle”). Many other participants followed this pattern, and we judged
that the training was ineffective for such cases.
But this was not the only way to fail in producing phenomenological descriptions. Other
participants seemed to find it difficult to focus on the experience or even the object presented here and
now. One participant (#14) made the following descriptions, for example:
Pre-test description (“Cracked egg”). What I first thought on seeing it is that I imagined an
egg. I really like soft boiled eggs, and they crack like this when you crack them, so that
immediately occurred to me. This shape like a crack made me imagine, though intuitively,
brain waves, peaks of heart sounds, and things like that. […]
Post-test description (“Cracked egg”). Honestly again what occurred to me is those cracks in
eggs. People have fixed ideas, so once it looks that way it only looks so. […] And this didn’t
happen earlier, but I’m starting to see it as a takoyaki [Japanese ball-shaped snacks] […] I
was born and have lived in Osaka all my life for 24 years, so close to Osaka, and I think this
is why I made an association with the Osaka speciality takoyaki.
Although the instruction was to describe the experience of seeing the figure, this participant mostly
reports on associations (“brain waves”, “takoyaki”) and attempts to explain them without referring to
the present experience here and now (“I really like soft boiled eggs”, “I have lived in Osaka all my
life”). Some other participants also failed to focus on the present experience of seeing the stimulus,
and we judged that the training was ineffective in all such cases.

5.2.3 An example of a participant already competent before the training
Some participants indicated a considerable level of competence in phenomenological description
before receiving the illusion training. Here is an example from one such participant (#16):

26

Pre-test description (“Cracked egg”). There is a wavy line which looks like mountains when
you lay to the side and difficult to describe when you stand it up. […] As to my gaze and
attention, it was first directed to the whole, and then I wondered what the figure is, and finally
I came to see the parts carefully rather than seeing the whole. [...]

The first sentence of this passage reports on the object of experience (“wavy line”) and its noematic
features (“looks like mountains”, “difficult to describe when you stand it up”). The second sentence
presents a close observation of a noetic feature of the experience (“it was first …, then …, and finally
…”). This suggests that this participant was already quite able to attend to the non-objectual aspects
of the experience before taking the training. Compare this with an excerpt from the post-test
description from the same participant:

Post-test description (“Cracked egg”). On first sight, a circle and a wavy line. […] When you
turn it sideways, it's like a wave, there is sea and sky, I felt a non-homogenous, irregular
realistic wave. I did not have the image of a wave so much earlier. I had a stronger impression
of the moon or the sun earlier, but by changing its direction and looking closely at it, I
thought it's easier to explain in terms of waves. [...]

It basically covers the same grounds as the pre-test description: it reports on the object of experience
(“a circle and a wavy line”), noematic features of its appearance (“non-homogenous, irregular
realistic wave”), and noetic features of one’s awareness (“changing its direction and looking
closely”). We therefore concluded that this participant did not improve the ability to describe one’s
experience as a result of taking the one-stage training program.

5.3 Discussion
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Experiment 2 tested the effectiveness of the one-stage phenomenological training program, consisting
of illusion training alone. In contrast to what has been suggested in Experiment 1, only five out of the
18 participants improved their phenomenological skill after taking the training. The other 13
participants showed no positive response to the training: 11 of them failed to attend to and describe
the subjective features of their experience before the training; two were somewhat able to do so
without the training; none of them showed any sign of improving their phenomenological competence
through the training program. It is unclear why the results were not as positive as they were in
Experiment 1. Given the small sample size, however, it is hard to draw any general conclusion about
the prospect of illusion training from these experiments. Having said that, the current result suggests
that a more active intervention in the learning process than just letting the participants practice the art
with respect to visual illusions may be useful to develop an effective training program (section 6.3).
It is also worth noting that, once again, considerable individual difference was found in the
participants’ ability to produce phenomenological descriptions. This time, the difference was not so
much about the response to the training program, but rather two interesting areas of difference
emerged. One is that a small group of participants were already fairly adept at phenomenological
description before taking the training. Another has to do with different patterns of failure: some
participants failed not only to provide careful descriptions of the experience, but to focus on the
experience at issue in the first place.

6. General discussion
These findings indicate several important lessons regarding the methodological project of developing
a short-term phenomenological training program. In the following, we consider the implications of the
results for this methodological project organized around three issues: (i) individual difference; (ii)
transferability of phenomenological skills from one domain of experience to another; (iii) active
interventions in the learning process.
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6.1 Individual difference in phenomenological aptitude
Both experiments confirmed a considerable degree of individual difference related to the ability to
produce phenomenological descriptions. Some people are more apt for phenomenological description,
which can be a matter of innate and/or acquired quality. This suggests that short-term training
approaches will benefit from investigating the nature of what might be called phenomenological
aptitude: What kinds of qualities are associated with that of being apt to engage in phenomenological
description? How do they make some people better than others at attending to and articulating
features of their experience?
There are studies demonstrating that observational drawing skill is supported by perceptual
capacities to attend to local features of an object, those to attend to global features of an object, and
those to switch flexibly between these perceptual modes (Chamberlain & Wagemans, 2015).
Intuitively, observational drawing and phenomenological description are similar in that they both
require that one carefully explore the ways in which the object appears to oneself. Hence, it is
possible that those attentional capacities that support observational drawing are beneficial in learning
how to produce phenomenological descriptions. There are a few other psychological factors which we
speculate might be relevant: for example, linguistic capacities for articulating the observed features of
experience, which may in fact also affect the quality of the observation itself; the ability to engage
patiently with a overwhelmingly difficult task; intellectual open-mindedness and curiosity towards
unfamiliar ways of thinking. In any case, the task of determining which individual qualities make up
phenomenological aptitudes demand further empirical research. Once those individual factors that
make the relevant individual differences are identified, researchers will be in a better position to
develop effective training programs.
In addition, individual differences in the effectiveness of the same training program suggest
the possibility of developing different programs for people with different levels of phenomenological
aptitude. In developing a short-term training program, accordingly, it may be important to be clear
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about the target population: that is, whether you are primarily trying to train participants with or
without phenomenological aptitude.

6.2 Bounded transferability of phenomenological skills
The results of Experiment 1 indicate that phenomenological skills developed in regard to one domain
of experience (e.g., pictorial perception of illusory figures) do not easily transfer to another domain
(e.g., object perception) (Section 4.2.3). This suggests that phenomenological skills in real life tend to
be more bound to specific domains of experience than one might expect from the common
characterization of the phenomenological method as a general-purpose tool applicable to any type of
conscious experience. This suggests that even if we worked out an effective training program, the
exact scope of the phenomenological skills it develops, or their degree of transferability to other
experiential types, would not be obvious in advance. In evaluating training programs, therefore, it is
important to examine the scope of the ensuing phenomenological skills. This is not to deny the
possibility of developing a universal phenomenological skill: that is, a general ability to effectively
execute phenomenological analyses to any type of conscious experience. It seems, however, that this
is an area where long-term trainings are necessary and that this goal lies far beyond the scope of shortterm training programs.

6.3 Active intervention in the learning process
In Experiment 1, we confirmed that the two-stage training program was somewhat effective for the
majority of participants. However, we also came to recognize that it is not ‘cheap’ enough to make it
widely accessible for experimenters who are starting to consider exploring the subjective features of
conscious experience. In Experiment 2, we tested a one-stage training program consisting only of the
illusion training, but then found that it had a smaller training effect. This suggest that we need
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something that goes between the two proposed schemes: that is, a training program that is less
demanding (‘cheaper’) than the two-stage program, but that intervenes more actively in the learning
process than the one-stage program. Here we can sketch two strategies for tackling this task.
The first strategy is to start with the two-stage program and to manualize the feedback
process. If we can formulate the steps for providing effective feedbacks in terms of specific
instructions, then the guidance stage will not be as inaccessible to researchers yet unfamiliar with the
phenomenological method. Given the skill-demanding character of the feedback process, however,
making a manual will not be an easy task; it is not even clear if it is a possible feat at all. Furthermore,
in order to develop a manual, a careful study of the art of giving feedbacks is necessary, and much
more data and insight about the feedback process is needed to conduct such study. Somewhat
paradoxically, accordingly, the first step towards accomplishing the manualization would be to start
attempting short-term phenomenological trainings involving the feedback process without relying on
any such manuals. Although theoretically possible, we do not find much hope in pursuing this path of
inquiry.
The second strategy is to improve the one-stage program by building some form of active
intervention in the learning process into it. One possibility is to incorporate a demonstration of
phenomenological description in the training program. For instance, instead of letting the participants
attempt to describe the experience of seeing a Rubin vase right after offering a lecture about the idea
of phenomenological description, as we did in Experiment 2, we can show them how an experienced
phenomenologist might approach the task. It may be even more effective if the demonstration adopted
a “Socratic method” so to speak: that is, if it consisted of questions that would prompt the participants
to attend to their experience in a phenomenological manner. Such demonstrations would be useful as
they can provide the participants with a concrete idea of what kind of description they are supposed to
produce. In other words, it fulfils a similar function as the feedback process in the guidance stage of
the two-stage training program. At the same time, it is preferable to the feedback process because it is
much less demanding for the experimenters: we can even think of recording the lecture and
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demonstration on film so that anyone can use the clip without going through any special training for
learning how to use the training program.

It may also be useful to include more pre-emptive measures against common errors in the
training program. Many participants failed to deliver adequate descriptions by reporting on things
other than their present experience: for example, by describing mental associations and metacognitive processes, by advancing general hypotheses about certain types of experience, or by
presenting speculative explanations about the underlying cause of their experience. To some extent, it
seems possible to prevent such errors by stating explicitly and concretely in advance that these are not
the kinds of things on which they are expected to focus.

7. Conclusion
We have discussed methodological lessons from our attempt to develop a short-term
phenomenological training program. In Experiment 1, we tested the effectivity of the two-stage
phenomenological training program, which aims to develop phenomenological skills for orienting
one’s attention towards and describing the non-objectual aspects of conscious experience, through
two stages of training called the illusion training and the guidance training. The program proved
effective for most participants, but it turned out to be exceedingly skill-demanding (‘expensive’) for
our purpose. In Experiment 2, we tested a more simplified one-stage training program, which only
consists of the illusion training. This program was much ‘cheaper’ compared to the two-stage
program, but it demonstrated a smaller training effect.
Based on these findings, we proposed some methodological lessons for the project of
developing short-term training programs. First, individual differences in phenomenological aptitude
constitute a topic that deserves further empirical research. Second, it is important in evaluating shortterm training programs to consider the scope of the phenomenological skills to be developed through
them. Third, and most importantly, an ideal short-term training program should be something that lies
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between the two programs discussed: that is, something that is less skill-demanding (‘cheaper’) than
the two-stage program, but that intervenes more actively in the learning process than the one-stage
program.
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Figure 1: Taxonomy of methods for phenomenological data collection. Each approach to
the problem of phenomenological data collection is represented as an outcome of making two
methodological decisions. Only one piece of work representative of each approach is listed in
the figure.
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Figure 2: Experiment 1. Training stimuli, experiment stimuli and the experiment
schedule. 2A: Illusory figures used in the illusion training. 2B: Non-illusory figures.
Participants in the control group were instructed to describe the experience of seeing them
during the first stage. 2C: Participants were instructed to describe the experience of seeing
these stimuli in all three test phases of the experiment. 2D: The experiment schedule. In the
training phases, the control group received fake trainings that superficially resembled the
illusion and the guidance trainings.
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C. Test stimuli
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Figure 3: Labelling Process. Each meaningful unit of description was given a label
according to the diagram below. Object of experience: Identifies what is being experienced;
Feature of the object: Describes features of the experienced object; Noematic feature:
Describe features of the appearance of the object; Noetic feature: Describe features of the
ways in which one is aware of the object; Correlative feature: Describe how the appearance
of the object and the way one is aware of it affect each other; Others: Describes nonobjectual features of the experience that do not squarely fit in the other categories;
Associations: Describe a thought, memory, imagination, or emotion induced by the perceptual
experience of an object; Sub-personal explanation: Explain why one is having the current
experience in reference to sub-personal processes; Generalization: Advance general claims
based on current experience.
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Figure 4: Experiment 2. Training stimuli, experiment stimuli and the experiment
schedule. 3A: Illusory figures used in the illusion training. 3B: Participants were instructed to
describe the experience of seeing these stimuli in the test phases of the experiment. 3C: The
experiment schedule.
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